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REFLECTIONS ON JUSTICE BLACK AND FREEDOM OF
SPEECH
INTRODUCTION
During his long and colorful tenure on the Supreme Court, Justice
Hugo L. Black did much to influence the development of the first
amendment freedom of speech. Like Justices Brandeis and Holmes before
him, Black, by means of his extensive opinions and outspoken lectures,
has left his personal trademark in the area of the individual's constitu-
tional right of expression.' Over the years, however, Black's approach
to the problems and controversies of free speech has defied ready classi-
fication. The traditional understanding of Black's philosophy seems to be
that speech is "absolutely" protected from abridgment. Truly, Justice
Black always referred to the Bill of Rights as a code of "absolutes; ' '2
more particularly, he continually stressed the propriety of a literal inter-
pretation of the first amendment provision that "Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech."' Nevertheless, it should
be pointed out that such an understanding of Black's philosophy of free
speech, without more elaboration, is quite misleading and incomplete.
This becomes evident when Black's frequently expressed view of the
first amendment as a shield for free speech is contrasted with his readi-
ness, during the last few years, to restrict freedom of expression in a
desire to preserve peace and order in the community. Therefore, while
there is an element of truth underlying the traditional understanding of
1. As one writer has pointed out:
It is . . . instructive to note how much easier [Justices Holmes and Brandeis]
had it in that relatively short and relatively tranquil span from Schenck Iv.
United States [249 U.S. 47 (1919)] to Near v. Minnesota [283 U.S. 697
(1931)] and Stromberg v. California [283 U.S. 359 (1931)]. They were
not asked to test classic notions of freedom of speech against group defama-
tion, labor picketing, obscenity, congressional committees, sound trucks,
public issue picketing, sit-ins, or that large array of direct and indirect sanc-
tions imposed upon the domestic Communist movement.
Kalven, Upon Rereading Mr. Justice Black on the First Amendment, 14 U.C.L.A.L.
REv. 428, 429 (1967).
2. "It is my belief that there are 'absolutes' in our Bill of Rights, and that they
were put there on purpose by men who knew what words meant, and meant their pro-
hibitions to be 'absolutes.'" Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 865, 867
(1960).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I. "I have to be honest about it. I confess not only that
I think the Amendment means what it says but also that I may be slightly influenced
by the fact that I do not think Congress should make any law with respect to
these subjects." Black & Cah, Justice Black and the First Amendment "Absolutes":
A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 549, 553 (1962).
et al.: Reflections on Justice Black and Freedom of Speech
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1972
REFLECTIONS
Black's philosophy, many qualifications and limitations must be made
apparent in an attempt to comprehend Black's theory of free speech in
its entirety.
THE CONTENT OF EXPRESSION
The essence of Black's philosophy of "absolutes" is derived from
his basic belief that no government should be allowed to regulate the
content of expression. In his James Madison Lecture at the New York
University School of Law, Black underscored this basic belief:
Since the earliest days philosophers have dreamed of a
country where the mind and spirit of man would be free; where
there would be no limits to inquiry; where men would be
free to explore the unknown and to challenge the most deeply
rooted beliefs and principles. Our First Amendment was a bold
effort to adopt this principle-to establish a country with no
legal restriction of any kind upon the subjects people could
investigate, discuss, and deny.4
It is quite clear from surveying his opinions of the last thirty-four
years that Black remained dedicated to the belief that the content of
expression should be granted absolute protection from censorship.
Radical and Subversive Ideologies
Legal history will show that in times of national crises Black became
more adamant in his belief that no ban should be placed upon any new or
radical idea. When the effects of the Cold War and the McCarthy
"witch-hunt" began to spread throughout the nation after World War
II, it was Black, a rather lonely dissenter in those days, who tried to
pacify the fears and suspicions that plagued the majority of the Court.
In American Communications Association v. Douds, the 'Court held
constitutional section 9(h) of the National Labor Relations Act' which
required labor leaders to file affidavits with the National Labor Relations
Board swearing their non-affiliation with subversive organizations.
Black vigorously dissented, maintaining that such a requirement re-
stricted freedom of speech by imposing penalties upon certain beliefs.
Referring to the opinion of Chief Justice Hughes in De Jonge v.
Oregon,' Black spoke of "time-honored" principles that should guide
the Court in such decisions:
4. Black, supra note 2, at 880-81.
5. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
6. Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, § 101, 61 Stat. 146.
7. 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
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The greater the importance of safeguarding the community
from incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force
and violence, the more imperative is the need to preserve
inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, free press
and free assembly . 8...'
In Dennis v. United States,' decided in the midst of the Korean
War, the defendant was convicted under the Smith Act"0 for conspiring
to advocate the forcible overthrow of the government. Black and
Douglas, the only dissenters, would have held the pertinent section of
the statute unconstitutional as an unauthorized restraint of free speech.'1
In Yates v. United States," leaders of the Communist Party of California
were indicted under the same statute. Black again argued for acquittal
of all defendants:
Unless there is complete freedom of expression of all ideas,
whether we like them or not, concerning the way the govern-
ment should be run and who should run it, I doubt if any
views in the long run can be secured against the censor. The
First Amendment provides the only kind of security system
that can preserve a free government--one that leaves the way
wide open for people to favor, discuss, advocate, or incite causes
and doctrines however obnoxious and antagonistic such views
may be to the rest of us."
In Barenblatt v. United States," a psychology teacher refused,
during an investigation by the House Committee on Un-American
Activities, to answer questions concerning his alleged ties with the
Communist Party, contending that the first amendment protected the
privacy of his individual beliefs. Ruling that the teacher's constitutional
rights were not infringed, the Court upheld a sentence of six months'
8. 339 U.S. at 453 (dissenting opinion).
9. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
10. 18 U.S.C. § 11 (1946), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1964).
11. Black made an open plea to his colleagues, urging them to interpret the first
amendment without allowing their personal fears to affect their future decisions:
Public opinion being what it now is, few will protest the conviction of
these Communist petitioners. There is hope, however, that in calmer times,
when present pressures, passions and fears subside, this or some later Court
will restore the First Amendment liberties to the high preferred place where
they belong in a free society.
341 U.S. at 581 (dissenting opinion).
12. 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
13. Id. at 344 (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
14. 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
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imprisonment.15 Black filed another lengthy dissent, claiming that the
majority had misinterpreted the free speech provisions of the Constitu-
tion:
History should teach us . . . that in times of high emotional
excitement minority parties and groups which advocate ex-
tremely unpopular social or governmental innovations will
always be typed as criminal gangs and attempts will always be
made to drive them out. It was knowledge of this fact, and of
its great dangers, that caused the Founders of our land to
enact the First Amendment as a guarantee that neither Congress
nor the people would do anything to hinder or destroy the
capacity of individuals and groups to seek converts . . . for any
cause .... 16
Defamation and Obscenity
Black's belief in the absolute protection of the content of expression
concerned not only expression categorized as subversive, but applied to
all subjects and ideas, even to expression which was regardesd by most
others as slanderous and obscene. In New York Times v. Sullivan,1"
the Court reversed a $500,000 Alabama libel judgment. Creating a new
standard, the Court ruled that damages from allegedly libelous state-
ments could not be recovered unless the statements were made with
actual malice. Concurring with the reversal, Black added:
I base my vote to reverse on the belief that the First and
Fourteenth Amendments not merely "delimit" a State's power
to award damages to "public officials against critics of their
official conduct" but completely prohibit a State from exercis-
ing such a power. . . . The requirement that malice be proved
provides at best an evanescent protection for the right critically
to discuss public affairs and certainly does not measure up to
the sturdy safeguard embodied in the First Amendment. Unlike
the Court, therefore, I vote to reverse exclusively on the ground
that the Times . . . had an absolute, unconditional constitu-
tional right to publish . . . their criticisms .... ,
15. The majority opinion written by Justice Harlan explained that where first
amendment rights are asserted to bar governmental interrogation, "resolution of the
issue always involves a balancing by the courts of the competing private and public
interests at stake in the particular circumstances shown." Id. at 126.
16. Id. at 151 (dissenting opinion) (footnote omitted).
17. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
18. Id. at 293 (concurring opinion) (emphasis added).
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In Beauharnais v. Illinois,9 the defendant, president of an organiza-
tion called the White Circle League, was convicted for distributing anti-
Negro leaflets on the streets of Chicago in violation of an all-inclusive
ordinance.2" The majority of the Court affirmed the criminal libel con-
viction, holding that such utterances were not within the area of con-
stitutionally protected speech. Black, to say the least, had a different
opinion: "My own belief is that no legislature is charged with the
duty or vested with the power to decide what public issues Americans
can discuss. In a free country that is the individual's choice, not the
state's."'"
Black's position on obscenity was consistent with his protection of
defamatory expression. When a special showing of Lady Chatterley's
Lover was made available so that the Court could decide whether the
movie was obscene, Black simply declined to view it.22 Similarly, Black
commonly refused to read allegedly obscene books and magazines which
were presented to the Court because of his strong belief that the United
States Supreme Court was without the constitutional power to censor
such expression."8 In Ginzburg v. United States,24 Black made this
belief apparent:
I find it difficult to see how talk about sex can be placed under
the kind of censorship the Court here approves without subject-
ing our society to more dangers than we can anticipate at the
moment. It was to avoid exactly such dangers that the First
Amendment was written and adopted. For myself I would
follow the course which I believe is required by the First
Amendment, that is, recognize that sex at least as much as any
other aspect of life is so much a part of our society that its
19. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
20. The Illinois Criminal Code made it unlawful for any person to:
manufacture, sell, or offer for sale, advertise or publish, present or exhibit
in any public place in this state any lithograph, moving picture, play, drama or
sketch, which . . . portrays depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of
virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, color, creed or religion which said
publication or exhibition exposes [them] to contempt, derision, or obloquy
or which is productive of breach of the peace or riots.
ILL. Rxv. STAT. ch. 38, § 478 (1949).
21. 343 U.S. at 270 (dissenting opinion).
22. Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of the State
of N. Y., 360 U.S. 684, 690 (1959) (concurring opinion).
23. "I have continuously voted to strike down all laws dealing with so-called
obscene materials since I believe such laws act to establish a system of censorship in
violation of the First Amendment." H. BLAcK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH, 46-47
(1968) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH].
24. 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
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discussion should not be made a crime.25
It is this "absolute" protection of the content of expression for
which Black is probably most remembered. Unhampered by a desire
to impose ever-changing standards and vague limitations upon the
subjects people discuss, Black professed a simple and consistent philosophy
which could be understood by all. 28 To summarize, Black succinctly
stated that "[m]y view is . . that freedom of speech means that you
shall not do something to people either for the views they have or the
views they express or the words they speak or write. '2 7
BLACK'S CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF "SPEECH" AND "CONDUCT"
It is critical to Black's outlook on freedom of expression to dis-
tinguish "speech" and "conduct." While he would afford absolute
protection to the kinds of expression he called "speech," Black would
grant only "reasonable" protection to expression deemed "conduct."2"
Basic to Black's notion of the proper bounds of free speech, as pointed
out in the previous section, was an appreciation for ideas and beliefs and
a desire to protect the content of expression. In American Communica-
tions Association v. Douds,29  as on numerous other occasions,"0
Black indicated that the freedom to think, according to his interpreta-
tion of the Constitution, should be absolute:
Blackstone recalls that Dionysus is "recorded to have executed
a subject, barely for dreaming that he had killed him . .. ."
Such a result, while too barbaric to be tolerated in our nation,
is not illogical if a government can tamper in the realm of
thought and penalize "belief" on the ground that it might lead
to illegal conduct. Individual freedom and governmental
25. Id. at 482 (dissenting opinion).
26. Unfortunately, however, the Supreme Court has refused to grant
absolute protection to speech under the First Amendment . . . and instead
has adopted various judicial tests which are applied on a case-by-case basis
to determine if the speech in question is entitled to protection.
A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 49-50. Some possible inconsistencies in Black's own
philosophy are presented in two decisions without dissent from Justice Black: NLRB
v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969), where the Court put a dampening effect
upon an employer's attempt to express his views on unionization; Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), where the Court held constitutional a municipal
ordinance forbidding distribution of commercial handbills.
27. Black & Cahn, supra note 3, at 559.
28. "In giving absolute protection to free speech, however, I have always
been careful to draw a line between speech and conduct." A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH
53.
29. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
30. See A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 51.
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thought-probing cannot live together. [Under] the First
Amendment "Beliefs are inviolate."' 1
Black's dissent in Douds also noted that "[the experiences of history]
underline the wisdom of the basic constitutional precept that penalties
should be imposed only for a person's own conduct, not for his
beliefs . . 2
Justice Black's intense belief in the value of a free flow of ideas
seems to have been based upon a philosophy somewhat akin to "social
Darwinism.""3 Undoubtedly he had a great faith in the common man's
ability to pick and choose the best way of life from the ideologies avail-
able and felt that such a trial-and-error process, though cumbersome,
was healthy for the nation itself. In his 1960 James Madison Lecture,
Black expounded upon this "constitutional faith :"
[The Framers] knew that free speech might be the friend
of change and revolution. But they also knew that it is always
the deadliest enemy of tyranny. With this knowledge they still
believed that the ultimate happiness and security of a nation
lies in its ability to explore, to change, to grow and ceaselessly
to adapt itself to new knowledge born of inquiry free from any
kind of governmental control over the mind and spirit of man. 4
Recognizing the fundamental importance of ideas in a democratic
society, Black attempted to insure their effective communication by
absolutely protecting certain modes of disseminating ideas and beliefs,
but only those modes of expression which he deemed "essential" to the
preservation of our individual liberties. Black referred to these "es-
sential" means of disseminating ideas in Carlson v. Landon : "I . . .
believe that the First Amendment grants an absolute right to believe
in any government system, discuss all governmental affairs, and argue
for desired changes in the existing order."36 In Konigsberg v. State
31. 339 U.S. at 446 (dissenting opinion) (footnote omitted).
32. Id. at 452 (emphasis added).
33. "Social Darwinism" was a nineteenth century philosophy based upon Darwin's
theory of natural selection. It was not Darwin, however, but Herbert Spencer who
applied the survival-of-the-fittest doctrine to the social sciences. See R. HOFSTADTER,
SocIAL DARwINIsM IN AMERIcAN THOUGHT (1944).
34. Black, supra note 2, at 881.
35. 342 U.S. 524 (1952). In Carlson, alien members of the Communist Party
were detained without bail pending determination of their deportability. The Court
held that there was no denial of due process in such a detention since there was a
reasonable cause to believe that release of the aliens would endanger the safety and
welfare of the nation.
36. Id. at 555 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis added).
et al.: Reflections on Justice Black and Freedom of Speech
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1972
REFLECTIONS
Bar,7 Black indicated that "a person rightfully walking or riding along
the streets and talking in a normal way could [not] have his views
controlled . . . for that would be a direct abridgment of speech itself." 8
On another occasion Black pointed out that "[t]he First and Four-
teenth Amendments take away from government, state and federal, all
power to restrict freedom of speech . . . where people have a right to be
for such purposes.""
From these sources and others,"° it seems that peaceful, orderly
and almost academic discussion is the only mode of communication
which Black would absolutely protect. It should become increasingly
apparent, therefore, that Black's concept of freedom of "speech" is limited
solely to the absolute protection of ideas and beliefs and the corresponding
opportunity to peacefully discuss them. All other means of expression
and communication, in Black's opinion, would be deemed "conduct,"
and would therefore be given only "reasonable" protection.
THE REGULATION OF CONDUCT
Although Black realized that conduct often, if not always, includes
an element of expression, he did not feel that such a mode of expression
was "essential" to the preservation of our individual liberties;1 he
therefore believed that conduct could be regulated when confronted by
substantial countervailing government interests.2 In determining whether
the regulation was reasonable, Black concluded that "a law which primari-
ly regulates conduct but which might also indirectly affect speech can be
upheld if the effect on speech is minor in relation to the need for control
of the conduct." 3 When broken down into its component parts, such a
37. 366 U.S. 36 (1961). In the heart of McCarthyism in 1953, Konigsberg, a
veteran of World War II, passed the California bar exam but was precluded from
joining the legal profession because of his refusal to answer questions concerning his
political affiliations.
38. Id. at 69 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis added).
39. A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 53.
40. See also Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 340 (1957) (concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 194 (1952)
(concurring opinion); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 579 (1951) (dissenting
opinion).
41. "Marching back and forth, though utilized to communicate ideas, is not
speech and therefore is not protected by the First Amendment." A CONSTITUTIONAL
FAITH 54.
42. I think the Founders of our Nation . . . meant precisely that the Federal
Government should pass "no law" regulating speech and press but should
confine its legislation to the regulation of conduct So too [the First Amend-
ment] leaves the States vast power to regulate conduct. ...
Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 517-18 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
43. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 139, 141 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
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statement reveals the two basic tenets of Black's philosophy of expres-
sion in the form of conduct."
First, it is clear that Black would not tolerate any regulation of
conduct which "directly" abridged "speech;" that is, he would never
uphold an ordinance or injunction which was aimed at the content of the
expression. As Black indicated in Konigsberg, he would not uphold as
constitutional "an ordinance which purported to rest upon the power of
a city to regulate traffic but which was aimed at speech or attempted to
regulate the content of speech . . . for that would be a direct abridg-
ment of speech itself."" Another example of a law which, in Black's
opinion, "directly" affected content is found in his opinion in Cox v.
Louisiana." There, Black held unconstitutional a breach-of-the-peace
statute regulating crowds and marchers on the ground that the statute
arbitrarily exempted labor unions from its provisions:
Standing, patrolling, or marching back and forth on streets is
conduct, not speech, and as conduct can be regulated or pro-
hibited. But by specifically permitting picketing for the publica-
tion of labor union views, Louisiana is attempting to pick
and choose among the views it is willing to have discussed on
its streets. . . . This seems to me to be censorship in a most
odious form, unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments."
When considering laws which regulated conduct, Black remained
steadfast in his hatred for censorship of views and ideas. Throughout
his term on the Court, Black never condoned laws which discriminated
against unpopular beliefs or which arbitrarily preferred one cause over
another; nor did he allow selective enforcement of laws which validly
regulated conduct." In cases in which views were expressed through
conduct, Black demanded equal protection for all views:
44. However, one writer has seen fit to observe that
the categories which Black has set up seem more complex than the direct-
indirect classification would indicate. There are factors of the purposive-
ness of the measure in relation to the control of expression, the generality or
selectivity of its impact in the realm of ideas, and its focus on the content of
utterance or on its time, place, or manner.
Freund, Mr. Justice Black and the Judicial Function, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 467, 472
(1967).
45. 366 U.S. at 69 (dissenting opinion).
46. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
47. Id. at 581 (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
48. "The United States Constitution does not forbid a State to control the use
of its own property for its own lawful nondiscriminatory purpose." Adderly v.
Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 48 (1966) (emphasis added).
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It is critical . . . that state regulatory laws in this area be
applied to all groups alike, and these laws must never be used
as a guise to suppress particular views which the government
dislikes."9
Secondly, Black would uphold laws which regulated conduct and
only "indirectly" affected the content of the expression if the effect on
expression was minor in relation to the reasons advanced in support of
the regulation. It was in this realm of expression that Black would adhere
to a "balancing test"-a weighing of the circumstances in each case-to
decide whether the government's interest in regulating the conduct was
legitimate and compelling:
[S]uch laws governing conduct . . . must be tested, though
only by a balancing process, if they indirectly affect ideas.
On the one side of the balance . . . is the interest of the United
States in seeing that its fundamental law protecting freedom of
communication is not abridged; on the other the obvious interest
of the state to regulate conduct within its boundaries.5"
In applying this balancing test, Black demanded certain minimum
requirements from the statutes and ordinances which attempted to reg-
ulate conduct. Initially, Black demanded that all such regulations be
narrowly drawn and narrowly construed, since an over-broad or vague
law might produce a chilling effect upon lawful means of expression."
In Milkwagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies,52 the Supreme
Court affirmed a decision which enjoined Illinois dairy union employees
from
walking up and down in front of [certain milk] stores
; discouraging . . . persons . . contemplating pur-
chasing . . ; interfering, hindering, or . divert[ing]
. . . persons desirous of . . . purchasing .
In response to the broad nature of the injunction, Black's dissent
stressed that:
[T]he Supreme Court of Illinois . . . has not marked the
49. A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 59.
50. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 142 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
51. "[S]tatutes which, in regulating conduct, may indirectly touch the areas of
freedom of expression should be construed narrowly where necessary to protect that
freedom." Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 325 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
52. 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
53. Id. at 309 (dissenting opinion).
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limits of the rule with that clarity which should be a prere-
quisite to an abridgment of free speech. Nor do I believe that
this Court . . has supplied that essential definiteness. What
we are here dealing with is an injunction, and not a "statute
narrowly drawn" . . . . Speaking of a similar abridgment of
constitutional rights where there was no guiding legislative act,
we said in Cantwell v. Connecticut: "Violation of an Act . . .
narrowly drawn to prevent the supposed evil, would pose a
[different] question .... Such a declaration of the state's policy
would weigh heavily in any challenge of the law as infringing
constitutional limitations. . . Here [however] we have a
situation analogous to a conviction under a statute sweeping
in a variety of conduct under a general and indefinite char-
acterization, and leaving to the executive and judicial branches
too wide a discretion in its application.""
In addition to his refusal to accept vague and overly broad regula-
tions of conduct, Black would not allow the state to regulate conduct in
a certain way if there were other means available to accomplish the
desired result without so burdening the means of expression. A good
example of this is provided in the case of Schneider v. Town of Irving-
ton,5 where, in order to prevent littering, the town council passed
ordinances prohibiting the distribution of handbills. As Black recounted,
[t]he Supreme Court forbade application of such ordinances
when they affected the distribution of literature designed to
spread ideas. There were other ways, we said, to protect the
city from littering which would not sacrifice the right of the
people to be informed."
In essence, then, Black would allow the state to regulate conduct if the
state had a legitimate and non-discriminatory interest in regulating that
conduct and if the ordinance provided the "least drastic means" of regu-
lating that conduct."
THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AN ORDERLY SOCIETY
Behind the distinction Black drew between speech and conduct lay
54. Id. at 306-07 (footnotes omitted).
55. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
56. A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 61.
57. Applying the "least drastic means" test in Schneider, the Court held that "the
public convenience in respect of cleanliness of the streets does not justify an exertion of
the police power which invades the free communication of the information and opinion
secured by the Constitution-" 308 U.S. at 163.
326
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a deep concern for the preservation of peaceful and orderly methods of
disseminating ideas and beliefs, i.e., a deep concern for the preservation
of the freedom of speech. It is vital to note that Black granted absolute
protection to speech because he considered such peaceful modes of ex-
pression "essential" to the preservation of our basic constitutional
liberties.58 At the same time, Black granted the state vast power to
regulate expression in the form of conduct because he felt that such
expression actually posed a serious threat to these same liberties.59 To
be more clear, it seems that Black sought to regulate conduct because
he believed that such means of expression naturally tended to infringe
the rights of others. Black has said that
[t]he regulation of picketing and marching is essential
since this conduct by its very nature tends to infringe the rights
of others. For example, no matter how urgently a person
may wish to exercise his First Amendment guarantees to speak
freely, he has no constitutional right to appropriate someone
else's property to do so. Our Constitution recognizes and sup-
ports the concept of private ownership of property and in the
Fifth Amendment provides that "no person . . . shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken for public use without just
compensation." The long and short of the problem is that while
the First Amendment does guarantee freedom to speak and
write, it does not at the same time provide for a speaker or
writer to use other people's private property to do so. This
means that there is no First Amendment right for people to
picket on the private premises of another to try to convert the
owner or others to the views of the pickets.6"
Black wholeheartedly believed that, by allowing conduct to be regulated
by valid, narrowly drawn laws, he was not restricting freedom but was
securing the basic constitutional rights of property, privacy and peaceful
expression. Black's opinions of the last decade consistently bear out this
belief. In Bell v. Maryland,61 twelve black students were convicted of
criminal trespass as a result of their participation in a sit-in demonstra-
tion at a Baltimore restaurant. The demonstrators appealed on the
ground that the conviction violated their first amendment freedom of
58. See note 39 supra.
59. See A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 55.
60. Id. at 57-58.
61. 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
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expression. Supporting the conviction, Black noted:
A great purpose of freedom of speech and press is to
provide a forum for settlement of acrimonious disputes peace-
ably, without resort to intimidation, force, or violence. The
experience of ages points to the inexorable fact that people are
frequently stirred to violence when property which the law
recognizes as theirs is forcibly invaded or occupied by others.
Trespass laws are born of this experience. They have been,
and doubtless still are, important features of any government
dedicated, as this country is, to a rule of law. Whatever power
it may allow the States or grant to the Congress to regulate the
use of private property, the Constitution does not confer upon
any group the right to substitute rule by force for rule by law.
Force leads to violence, violence to mob conflicts, and these
to rule by the strongest . . . .At times the rule of law seems
too slow to some for the settlement of their grievances. But it
is the plan our Nation has chosen to preserve both "Liberty"
and equality for all.62
In Cox v. Louisiana," demonstrators protesting an alleged illegal
arrest were charged with the statutory offenses of disturbing the peace,
obstructing public passages and picketing before a courthouse. Black
held for a reversal of the breach-of-the-peace conviction for vagueness 4
and of the obstruction charge on equal protection grounds,65 but voted
to uphold the conviction for picketing near the courthouse:
Justice cannot be rightly administered . . . where throngs
of people clamor against the processes of justice right outside
the courthouse or jailhouse doors. The streets are not now and
never have been the proper place to administer justice. Use of
the streets for such purposes has always proved disastrous to
individual liberty in the long run, whatever fleeting benefits
may have appeared to have been achieved. 6
Black also stressed his belief that the first amendment granted no con-
stitutional right to picket or patrol on publicly or privately owned streets:
"[w]ere the law otherwise, people on the streets, in their homes and
62. Id. at 346 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis added).
63. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
64. Id. at 577 (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
65. Id. at 581.
66. Id. at 583 (emphasis added).
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anywhere else could be compelled to listen against their will to speakers
they did not want to hear."'
In Brown v. Louisiana,6" five black defendants were charged with
disrupting the peace by congregating in a public library and refusing
to disperse when so ordered. After emphasizing that the statute in
question was narrowly drawn 9 and that there was no evidence of
racial discrimination in the record,"0 Black voted to uphold the con-
viction:
The First Amendment, I think, protects speech, writings, and
expression of views in any manner in which they can be
legitimately and validly communicated. But I have never be-
lieved that it gives any person or group of persons the con-
stitutional right to go wherever they want, whenever they
please, without regard to the rights of private or public pro-
perty . . . . [It] does not guarantee to any person the right
to use someone else's property, even that owned by the govern-
ment and dedicated to other purposes, as a stage to express
dissident ideas."'
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District,72 three
public school pupils were suspended from classes for wearing black
armbands as a symbol of protest against the Vietnam war. These pupils
sought an injunction against their principal's prohibition of such con-
duct. While the majority of the Court voted to protect the wearing of the
armbands under the circumstances as an act "closely akin to pure
speech," Black dissented. Upon the premise that public schools were set
up to teach a selected curriculum to young children who needed to learn,
Black held that such acts of protest in the classroom distracted from that
"singleness of purpose."'" Again Black emphasized the need for regula-
tion of expression in the form of conduct when such means of expression
infringe the rights of others:
The truth is that a teacher . . . no more carries into a school
with him a complete right to freedom of speech and expression
67. Id. at 578.
68. 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
69. Id. at 158 (dissenting opinion).
70. Id. at 160.
71. Id. at 166 (emphasis added). See also Amalgamated Food Employees v. Lo-
gan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 327 (1968) (dissenting opinion).
72. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
73. Id. at 524 (dissenting opinion).
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than an anti-Catholic or anti-Semite carries with him a com-
plete freedom of speech and religion into a Catholic church or
Jewish synagogue. . It is a myth to say that any person
has a constitutional right to say what he pleases, where he
pleases, and when he pleases."4
In purposefully placing definite limitations on expression in the
form of conduct, Black was merely interpreting the constitutional pro-
tection of expression in the context of an orderly society governed by a
rule of law." By regulating conduct, Black attempted to preserve the
individual's constitutional rights of property and privacy. However,
Black's deepest concern in regulating conduct was the preservation of
the freedom of speech-the preservation of peaceful modes of expression.
It is not surprising, then, that Black's greatest worry over the years
was a fear that mob-type demonstrations would create a climate of
anarchy in which the right to peacefully express all ideas and all beliefs
would be swept away by a rule of force. This concern, which can not
easily be assuaged, is evident in Black's impassioned warning in Cox:
And minority groups, I venture to suggest, are the ones who
always have suffered and always will suffer most when street
multitudes are allowed to substitute their pressures for the less
glamorous but more dependable and temperate processes of the
law. Experience demonstrates that it is not a far step from what
seems the earnest, honest, patriotic, kind-spirited multitude of
today, to the fanatical, threatening, lawless mob of tomorrow.
And the crowds that press in the streets for noble goals today
can be supplanted by street mobs pressuring . . . for precisely
opposite ends."6
EPILOGUE
Justice Black's philosophy of freedom of speech has been criticized
from many points of view. It is obvious that his position concerning the
proper protection for obscenity, slander and radical ideas has never
enjoyed much favor with the Supreme Court." Some critics have
74. Id. at 521-22 (emphasis added).
75. What we have in this country is a government of laws, designed to achieve
justice to all, in the most orderly fashion possible, and without leaving behind
a deluge of hate-breeding divisions and dangerous riots.
A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 63.
76. 379 U.S. 559, 583-84 (1959) (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
77. Upon surveying Black's opinions which grant absolute protection to all ideas
and beliefs, it is clear that Black's position is a minority one. In consistently protecting
the content of speech, Black developed an open-minded but dissenting philosophy.
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labeled his opinions in the demonstration cases of the last few years a
dramatic reversal of a champion of free speech."8 Still others have
theorized that such opinions are a product of a conservatism brought on
by the changing times and effect of the years upon an already aged
jurist.7" Perhaps some of this is true; however, any such change should
not be exaggerated. Notions of Black's belief in a rule of law and the
desirability of peaceful expression of ideas and beliefs in an orderly so-
ciety can historically be traced to his first years on the bench."0 It seems
that the recent demonstration cases merely provided Black a golden
opportunity to clarify and illustrate his philosophy of free speech in its
entirety."'
Over the many years he served on the Supreme Court, Black went
to great lengths to develop and profess his fundamental theory of the
first amendment freedom of speech. Rather than balancing the precious
freedom of expression on a case-to-case basis, Black did most of his
balancing within a definitional framework, thus offering helpful guide-
lines and predictability in an area of essential constitutional liberties.
In retrospect, one may say that Justice Black has been admirably con-
sistent in his treatment of the problems of free speech and tireless in his
efforts to secure the peaceful dissemination of ideas and beliefs in an
orderly society.
78. Indicative of such criticism is Justice Fortas' biting statement in Tinker: "[We]
do not confine the permissible exercise of the First Amendment rights to a telephone
booth or the four corners of a pamphlet, or to supervised and ordained discussion in the
school classroom." 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
79. See Justice Black Dissents-Turning "Conservative"!, 60 U.S. NEWS AND
WORLD Rp., March 21, 1966, at 26.
80. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (dissenting opinion) ; Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) ; Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 146 (1939);
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
81. Black was eager to deliver the Carpentier Lectures at the Columbia University
School of Law in 1968 so that he could answer the critics who accused him of reversing
his stand on the freedom of expression in light of his opinions concerning sit-ins and
picketing: "[T]his view that I am now expressing is not a new one with me, but one I
have held for a long time. I have never doubted the power of government over its
streets and public places." A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 58-59.
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